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Abstract
The security of the previous quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, which is guaranteed by
the nature of physics law, is based on the legitimate users. However, impersonation of the legitimate
communicators by eavesdroppers, in practice, will be inevitable. In fact, the previous QKD proto-
cols is un secure without authentication in practical communication. In this paper, we proposed an
improved QKD protocol that can simultaneously distribute the quantum secret key and verify the
communicators’ identity. This presented authentication scheme is provably secure.
PACS:0365.Bz
1 Introduction
Since the first finding that quantum effects may protect privacy information transmitted
in an open quantum channel by S.Wiesner [1], and then by C.H.Bennett and G.Brassard
[2], a remarkable surge of interest in the international scientific and industrial commu-
nity has propelled quantum cryptography into mainstream computer science and physics.
Furthermore, quantum cryptography is becoming increasingly practical at a fast pace.
Several quantum key distribution protocols have been proposed, three main protocols of
these are the BB84 protocol [3], B92 protocol [4], and EPR protocol [5]. The first quan-
tum key distribution prototype, working over a distance of 32 centimetres in 1989, was
implemented by means of laser transmitting in free space [6]. Soon, several experimen-
tal demonstrations by optical fibre were set up[7]. After that, a lot of publications have
been presented, which cover three aspects: 1) QKD protocols [8-10], 2) security of QKD
protocols and detection of eavesdropper [11-16] and 3) practical application of quantum
cryptography [17-20].
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Quantum cryptography employs quantum phenomena such as the Heisenberg uncer-
tainty principle and the quantum corrections to protect distributions of cryptographic
keys. Key distribution is defined as procedure allowing two legitimate users of communi-
cation channel to establish two exact copies, one copy for each user, of a random and secret
sequence of bits. In other words, quantum cryptography is a technique that permits two
parties, who share no secret information initially, to communicate over an open channel
and to establish between themselves a shared secret sequence of bits. Quantum cryptog-
raphy is provably secure against eavesdropping attack, in that, as a matter of fundamental
principle, the secret data can not be compromised unknowingly to the legitimate users
of the channel. Three ingenious protocols in quantum cryptography have been proposed.
The first, by Bennett et al [3], relies on the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics
to provide key security. The security guarantee is derived from the fact that each bit of
data is encoded at random on either one of a conjugate pair of observables of quantum-
mechanical object. Because such a pair of observables is subjected to the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle, measuring one of the observables necessarily randomizes the other.
A further elegant technique has been proposed by Ekert [5], which relies on the violation
of the Bell inequalities to provide the secret security. And the third technique, devised
by Bennett [4], is based on the transmission of nonorthogonal quantum states.
However, the cryptography and the cryptanalytics are always a pairs contradiction.
Once a cryptographic protocol is proposed, eavesdropper (Eve) will try to break it. Quan-
tum cryptography is also no exception, although the quantum cryptography is thought
to be provably security. With the quantum key distribution protocols presented, several
attacks strategy have been proposed, such as intercept/resend scheme [6], beamsplit-
ting scheme [6], entanglement scheme [14] and quantum copying [15,16]. In the inter-
cept/resend scheme, Eve intercepts selected light pulses and reads them in bases of her
choosing. When this occurs, Eve fabricates and sends to Bob a pulse of the same polar-
ization as she detected. However, due to uncertainty principle, at least 25% of the pulse
Eve fabricates will yield the wrong result if later successfully measured by Bob. The
other attack, beamsplitting, depends on the fact that transmitted light pulses are not
pure single-photon states. In the entanglement scheme, Eve involves the carrier particle
in an interaction with her own quantum system, referred to as probe, so that the particle
and the probe are left in an entangled state, and a subsequent measurement of the probe
yields information about the particle. Some investigators are now turning their attention
to collective attacks and joint attacks. About these attacks description please see Ref.[13]
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and its references. Eve can also use the quantum copying to obtain information between
Alice and Bob. Two kind quantum copies are presented [15,16]. It is appropriate to
emphasize the limitation of above attacks strategy. All these mentioned attacks strategy
are restricted by the uncertainty principle or the quantum corrections, so Eve can not
break the quantum cryptography protocols. The risk of eavesdropper is to disturb the
information and to be detected finally by the legitimate users. This is the reason why
quantum cryptography is declared to be provably secure.
However, The security of the previous quantum key distribution protocols, which is
guaranteed by the nature of physics law, is based on the legitimate users. In practice,
the impersonation of Alice or Bob by eavesdropper will be existed in a large probability.
Circumventing the impersonation needs to verify the identity of communicators, saying
Alice and Bob.
In section 2 we give the preliminary ingredients, which are important quantum effects
in quantum cryptography. Section 3 reviews the QKD protocols. In section 4 we propose
a QKD protocol with authentication function. It is composed of two phases, i.e., the
initial phase and QKD with authentication phase. In section 5 we analyze the security of
the presented scheme. We conclude in section 6.
2 Preliminaries
The recent results in quantum cryptography are associated with the Heisenberg uncer-
tainty principle of quantum mechanics, EPR effects. In follows, we briefly describe these
quantum effects.
2.1 Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle
Using standard Dirac notation, this principle can be succinctly stated as follows:
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle: For any two quantum mechanical observables A and
B, if the corresponding operators Aˆ, Bˆ satisfy
[
Aˆ, Bˆ
]
= AˆBˆ − BˆAˆ,
then
〈∆A〉 〈∆B〉 ≥ 1
2
‖〈[A,B]〉‖ ,
where 〈∆A〉 and 〈∆B〉 are average value of operators ∆Aˆ and ∆Bˆ, respectively.
∆Aˆ = Aˆ− 〈A〉 and ∆Bˆ = Bˆ − 〈B〉 .
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Thus, 〈∆A〉 and 〈∆B〉 are variances which measure the uncertainty of observables A
and B. For incompatible observables, i.e., for observables A and B such that [A,B] 6= 0,
reducing the uncertainty 〈∆A〉 of A forces the uncertainty 〈∆B〉 of B to increase, and vice
versa. Thus the observables A and B can not be simultaneously measured to arbitrary
precision. Measuring one of the observables interferes with the measurement of the other.
Heisenberg uncertainty principle can be applied to design a completely secure channel
in quantum cryptographic communication protocols, that communicate random binary
sequences (i.e., keys) with automatic eavesdropping detection. As a result, the perfect
security of the Vernam cipher (i.e., one-time-pad) is an inexpensively implementable re-
ality.
An example is the uncertainty of light polarization, which is extensive used in quantum
cryptography. There are two kind photons, one is polarized in one of the two ‘rectilinear’
directions, i.e., vertical (90 degrees) or horizontal(0 degrees), and the another is polarized
in one of two ‘diagonal’ directions, i.e., 45 degrees or 135 degrees. The two directions
of ‘rectilinear’ photon or ‘diagonal’ photon can be reliably distinguished by a proper
measurement. However, the two kind photons can not be distinguished because of the
limitation of uncertainty principle. Rectilinear and diagonal polarization are complemen-
tary properties in the sense that measuring either property necessarily randomizes the
other.
2.2 EPR effect and Bell’s Theorem
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) effect play an important role in quantum information
processing. It occurs when a spherically symmetric atom emits two photons in opposite
directions toward two observers, Alice and Bob.The two photons are produced in an ini-
tial state of undefined polarization. But because of the symmetry of the initial state, the
polarization of the photons, when measured, must have opposite values, provided that
the measurements are of the same type. For example, if Alice and Bob both measure rec-
tilinear polarization, they each equally likely to record either a 0 (horizontal polarization)
or a 1 (vertical), but if Alice obtains a 0, Bob will certainly obtain a 1 and vice versa.
The unusual and important aspect of the EPR effect is that the polarization of both
photons is determined as soon as, but not before, one of the photons is measured. This
happens no matter how far apart the photons may be at the time. This ‘classical’ expla-
nation of the EPR effect is somewhat counterintuitive, and indeed all classic explanations
of the EPR effect involve some implausible element, such as instantaneous action at a
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distance. Yet the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics accounts for the EPR
effect in a straightforward manner, and experiment have amply confirmed the existence
of the phenomenon.
Of course, EPR effect may occur on various particles not only on photons. Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) in the their famous 1935 paper [21] challenged the foundations
of quantum mechanics by pointing out a “paradox.” There exist spatially separated pairs
of particles, henceforth called EPR pairs, whose states are correlated in such a way that
the measurement of a chosen observable A of one automatically determines the result of
the measurement of A of the other. Since EPR pairs can be pairs of particles separated
at great distances, this leads to what appears to be a paradoxical “action at a distance.”
In 1964, Bell [22] gave a means for actually testing for locally hidden variable theories.
He proved that all such locally hidden variable theories must satisfy the Bell inequality.
Quantum mechanics has been shown to violate the inequality.
Bell’s theorem provides a method for checking eavesdropping. In following we give
a brief reviews. For convenience, we explain Bell’s theorem with spin-1
2
particle pairs.
Consider two measurable quantities A and B, and label the (discrete) possible values of
A and B by αi and βj, the corresponding unit vectors are ai,and bj , respectively. Then
E(ai, bj) = P++(ai, bj) + P−−(ai, bj)− P−+(ai, bj)− P+−(ai, bj),
where P±±(ai, bj) denotes the probability that result ±1 has been obtained along ai and
±1 along bj . The correlation coefficient S is obtained
S =
∑
i,j
E(ai, bj).
According to quantum rules
E(ai, bj) = −ai · bj .
So, quantum mechanics requires
S = −2
√
2.
Intervention of eavesdropper induces
S =
∫
ρ(na, nb)dnadnb[
√
2na · bb],
where na, nb are two unit vectors (for particles a, and b, respectively), ρ(na, nb) is the
probability of intercepting a spin component along a given direction for a particular
measurement. In this case,
−
√
2 ≤ S ≤
√
2.
By the correlation coefficients, the legitimate user may detect the eavesdropper.
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3 Quantum key distribution protocols
A lot of QKD protocols have been presented, they have similar procedure. The legitimate
communicators, known as Alice and Bob, communicate over a public channel in following
phases. step 1 is dedicated to raw key extraction, step 2 to error estimation, step 3 to
checking eavesdropping, step 4 to reconciliation, i.e., to reconciled key extraction, and
step 5 to privacy amplification, i.e., extraction of final secret key.
3.1 Quantum key distribution protocols
Step 1. Quantum transmission over quantum communication channel
The communicators set up a quantum channel, then they transmit quantum states
(Qubits) over the quantum channel. It is noted that the transmission model is different for
different QKD protocol. Two typical transmission are BB84 protocol and EPR protocol.
The former transmits non-commute quantum states, and the latter transmits one of each
EPR pairs
Step 2. Extraction of raw key over a public channel
After Alice and Bob obtain what is call the raw data by the quantum transmission,
the raw data must be sifted because it consists of those bits which Bob either did not
receive at all or did not correctly measure in the basis used to transmit them. Such
“non-receptions” could be caused by Eve’s intrusion or by dark counts in Bob’s detecting
device. The location of the dark counts are, of course, communicated by Bob to Alice
over the public channel. By comparison publicly the basis between Alice and Bob, the
data sifting procedure is completed.
Step 3. Check of eavesdropper
This step depends on the different QKD protocols. In BB84 protocol, Alice and Bob
now use the public channel to estimate the error rate in raw key. They publicly select
and agree upon a random sample of raw key, publicly compare these bits to obtain an
estimate R of the error-rate. These revealed bits are discarded from raw key. If R exceeds
a certain threshold RMax, then it will be impossible for Alice and Bob to arrive at a
common secret key. If so, Alice and Bob return to stage 1 to start over. On the other
hand, If the error estimate R does not exceed RMax, then Alice and Bob move onto phase
3. In EPR protocol, one may use the correction of EPR pairs to check eavesdropping.
Step 4. Extraction of reconciled key
In step 2, Alice and Bob’s objective is to remove all errors from what remains of raw
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key to produce an error free common key, called reconciled key. This phase is of course
called reconciliation, and takes place in two stage.
In stage 1, Alice and Bob publicly agree upon a random permutation, and apply it
to what remains of their respective raw keys. Next Alice and Bob partition the remnant
raw key into blocks of length ℓ, where the length ℓ is chosen so that blocks of this length
are unlikely to contain more than one error. For each of these blocks, Alice and Bob
publicly compare overall parity checks, making sure each time to discard the last bit of
the compared block. Each time a overall parity check does not agree, Alice and Bob
initiate a binary search for the error, i.e., bisecting the block into two subblocks, publicly
comparing the parities for each of these subblocks, discarding the right most bit of each
subblock. They continue their bisective search on the subblock for which their parities
are not in agreement. This bisective search continues until the erroneous bit is located
and deleted. They then continue to the next ℓ-block.
Stage 1 is repeated, i.e., a random permutation is chosen, remnant raw key is parti-
tioned into blocks of length ℓ, parities are compared, etc. This is done until it becomes
inefficient to continue in this fashion.
Alice and Bob then move to stage 2 by using a more refined reconciliation procedure.
They publicly select randomly chosen subsets of remnant raw key, publicly compare par-
ities, each time discarding an agreed upon bit from their chosen key sample. If a parity
should not agree, they employ the binary search strategy of step 1 to locate and delete
the error.
Finally, when, for some fixed number N of consecutive repetitions of stage 2, no error
is found, Alice and Bob assume that to a very high probability, the remnant raw key is
without error. Alice and Bob now rename the remnant raw key reconciled key, and move
on to the final and last phase of their communication.
Step 5. Privacy amplification
Alice and Bob now have a common reconciled key which they know is only partially
secret from Eve. They now begin the process of privacy amplification, which is the
extraction of a secret key from a partially secret one [23].
By the distillation art of secret key, the so called privacy amplification, a final secure
quantum key is generated and distributed. The basic principle of privacy amplification
is as follows. Let Alice and Bob shared a random variable W , such as a random n-bit
string, while an eavesdropper Eve learns a corrected random variable V , providing at most
t < n bits of information about W , i.e., H(W |V ) ≤ n − t. Eve is allowed to specify an
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arbitrary distribution PVW (unknown to Alice and Bob) subject to the only constraint that
R(W |V = v) ≤ n − t with high probability (over values v), where R(W |V = v) denotes
the second-order conditional Renyi entropy of W , given V = v. For any s < n− t, Alice
and Bob can distill r = n − t − s bits of the secret key K = G(W ) while keeping Eve’s
information about K exponentially small in s , by publicly choosing the compression
function G at random from a suitable class of maps into {0, 1}n−t−s. It can be shown that
Eve’s average information about the final secret key is less than 2−s/ln2 bits.
3.2 The drawback of previous QKD protocols
Obviously, the above procedure is based on the legitimate users, refereed to as Alice and
Bob. However, the practical existence of impersonation of Alice or Bob by eavesdropper,
make us have to take some action to against the eavesdropper, an efficient way is to verify
the communicators’ identity. Unfortunately, there is no known way to initiate authen-
tication without initially exchanging secret key over a secure communication channel in
previous protocols.
In fact, quantum key distribution protocol is completely insecurity under the attack-
ing of middle-attack. When Alice communicates Bob, Eve intercepts all qubit sent by
Alice, and communicates Bob with impersonating Alice. Finally, Eve obtains two keys
KAE, KEB, where KAE represents the secret key between Alice and Eve, and KAE rep-
resents the secret key between Bob and Eve. As a result Eve can easily decrypt the
ciphertext sent by Alice or Bob.
Of course, Alice and Bob may use the classic (where ‘classic’ contraposes quantum)
authentication technology to prove the legitimated identity. However, because Alice and
Bob can not simultaneously complete the identity verification and quantum key distribu-
tion, Eve may avoid the authentication procedure. So, practically, QKD protocol with
identity verification is necessary. In the follows, we improve the previous quantum key
distribution scheme to guarantee the security of quantum key for truly legitimate users.
4 QKD protocol with identity verification
Follows we propose a scheme to implement quantum authentication in QKD protocol. It
may be implemented by non-commute quantum states or non-orthogonal quantum states
with Heisenberg uncertainty principle. It also can be implement by EPR pairs associated
with Bell’s theorem. In this paper, we use EPR pair with the Bell’s theorem to implement
8
quantum authentication. Both the identity verification and quantum key distribution are
used in our proposed secure authentication protocol. There are two phase in the quantum
authentication protocol. The initial phase is completed at the key information center to set
up the system. and the authentication phase is executed between the two communication
parties to achieve mutual authentication and exchange the secure quantum key.
4.1 Initial Phase
Assuming the information center is legitimate and believable. The information center
is responsible neither for mutual authentication nor for the generation of quantum keys.
The role of this center is to simply help the legitimate user to obtain the authentication
key. In initial phase, we use the Biham’s technology[24]. It uses the quantum memory,
about the implementation of qubit in quantum memory may refer to reference[24]. In
fact, the communicators and the center are composed of a network. When the secure
network system is setting up, the information center will execute the following steps.
1. Alice and Bob send the center their IDA, IDB to register to this secure network. Then
the center sets up quantum channel between Alice and the center, and between Bob
and the center.
2. Alice and Bob respectively prepare EPR pairs, and send respectively one of the each
EPR pairs to the center.
3. Check eavesdropping between Alice and the center, and between Bob and the center.
The center randomly chooses qubits from the strings sent by Alice and Bob, and
checks the correction of quantum states like in EPR protocol.
4. The center must be able to keep the quantum states for a while ( in case the states do
not arrive at the same time from Alice and Bob) and then measures the eigenvalue
of the total-spin operator of the first pair, the second pair. etc. Except for the qubits
for detection of eavesdropping.
5. The center tells Alice and Bob the result of the measurement.
6. If the result of the measurement is s = 0, Bob knows Alice’s bit and vice versa. If
the result of the measurement is s = 1, Alice and Bob discard the transmission.
7. Alice and Bob keep the bits which correspond to s = 0 as the raw authentication
key K ′1. Proceeding the key K
′
1 like QKD described in section 3, one obtains the
authentication key K1.
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Once the legitimate users obtain the authentication keys K1, the information center is
not needed in further communication between Alice and Bob.
4.2 Authentication phase
Step 1. Alice and Bob transfer the common key K1 into a sequence of measurement basis.
While Alice and Bob need to verify their identification, or need to set up a new commu-
nication, they secretly transfer the reserved common key into a sequence of measurement
basis. For example, if Alice and Bob use the measurement basis of polarization photon
which was used in BB84 quantum key distribution protocol, they may let the bit ’0’
correspond to rectilinear measurement basis and ’1’ correspond to diagonal measurement
basis, or vice versa. We represent rectilinear measurement basis by the symbol ⊘, and
represent diagonal measurement basis by the symbol ⊙. After transferred, Alice and Bob
obtain a sequence of measurement basis, respectively. For example, if the common key is
001101, the sequence of measurement basic is ⊙⊙⊘⊘⊙⊘.
Step 2. Alice and Bob set up a quantum communication channel. When Alice wants
to secretly communicate Bob, Alice and Bob need to set up a quantum channel. The
transmitting quantum states in the quantum channel may be arbitrary. For example
the polarization photon state or the phase correction states. In this protocol, we use
the phase correction states. So the channel consists of a source that emits EPR pairs
of spin-1
2
particle, in a singlet state. The particles fly apart along the z axis, towards
the two legitimate users of the channel. Alice chooses a random basis for measuring one
numbering of each EPR pair of particles. The other particle of each EPR pair is measured
by Bob in the next step. Alice’s measurement results in effect determine, through the
EPR corrections, a sequence of states for Bob’s particles.
Step 3. Bob measures the stings of quantum states. Bob randomly measures the
sequence of quantum states by using two measurement basis M,MK1, where M is the
measurement basis for quantum key distribution and for obtaining new authentication key,
MK1 is the measurement basis for identity authentication in the current communication.
M is like that in EPR protocol.
Step 4. Alice and Bob check the eavesdropper. For secure communication, the legit-
imates users Alice and Bob need to firstly detect eavesdropper. Bob randomly chooses
some measurement results measured by the basis M for checking the correction of EPR
pair. According to the Bell’s theorem described in subsection 2.2 to judge the eavesdrop-
ping.
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Step 5. Bob encrypts his results measured by MK1. Although Bob does not know the
qubits measured by Alice, it will not influence the identity verification. Expressing the
strings of quantum states for authentication by
|Ψ >= {|ψ1 >, |ψ2 >, · · · , |ψn >}.
Where |ψi > represents a qubit received by Bob. After measurement, Bob obtains
|Φ >=MK1 |Ψ >,
where |Φ >= {|φ1 >, |φ2 >, · · · , |φn >} represents the measurement results under mea-
surement basis MK1. Transferring |Φ > into binary bits strings m, and then using K1 to
encrypt it, Bob obtains the ciphertext
y = EK1(m).
Bob sends Alice the ciphertext y, and tells Alice the corresponding sequence numbers of
quantum states |ψi >, i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Step 5. Verifying Bob’s identity. Having received Bob’s results, Alice analyzes Bob’s
results. Alice decrypts the ciphertext,
m = E−1K1(y),
and compare her results with m, thereby Alice gets the measurement basis MKt. If
Kt = K1, Bob’s identity is true.
Step 6 Verifying Alice’ identity. After Alice decrypted the ciphertext, Alice sends Bob
the result m′. If m′ = m, the Alice’s identity is true.
Step 7. Alice and Bob distribute the quantum secret key. If the communicators are
legitimate, Alice and Bob distribute the quantum secret key using the remainder Qubits.
The process is same as EPR protocol.
Step 8. Alice and Bob discard the authentication keys K1, and set up new authen-
tication keys. After authentication, the authentication key K1 is no longer use. The
legitimate users obtain a new authentication key. The method is like that used in QKD
protocol. Of course, one can directly take portion bits from the final quantum key as the
authentication key.
It has been noted that the presented protocol can not prevent voluntary attack. This is
a drawback of quantum cryptography. How to prevent the voluntary attack needs further
investigation.
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5 Security analysis
The proposed QKD protocol with authentication is provably secure. Obviously, the QKD
is provably secure because we use the previous QKD protocol. So in following, we mainly
analyze the security of authentication scheme. In initial phase, the security derives from
the security of the EPR protocol, and relies on the fact that the singlet state is the
only state for which the two spins are anticorrelated both in Sˆz and in the Sˆx basis. So
eavesdropper and the center can not obtain the authentication key K1.
In authentication phase, we believe this scheme is secure as the follows reason. i) Our
protocol does not have the conspiracy problem of masquerading. If a forger wants to
masquerade user Alice or Bob to communicate with others, he must find the common
key. However, it is difficult to obtain the shared common secret because of the follows
two reasons. First, the authentication key is obtained by the quantum key distribution
protocol which is provably secure, so the authentication key is secure. Second the authen-
tication key is used only one times, eavesdropper does not know any information about
the authentication key. ii) The replay-attack will also not succeed in our protocol because
the key is used only one times. iii) The quantum attacking strategy is invalid, the reason
is the same as the analysis for previous QKD protocols.
There is a weakness in our protocol. The only weakness of our protocol is the reserva-
tion of authentication key. Although the obtaining of the common key in the last quantum
communication is provably secure, the common key reservation has not circumvented the
catch 22 problem. In fact, this drawback exists in all symmetric cryptographic authen-
tication system. Of course, we can use the EPR effects or other quantum effect to keep
the common key, but the reservation time is very short according to current technology.
A long time correction of quantum states is need in the future.
6 Conclusion
The previous QKD protocols are based on the legitimate users. However, the practi-
cal existence of impersonation of Alice or Bob by eavesdropper, make us have to take
some action to against the eavesdropper, an efficient way is to verify the communicators’
identity. Unfortunately, there is no known way to initiate authentication without ini-
tially exchanging secret key over a secure communication channel in previous protocols.
Of course, one can use the classic authentication protocol to verify identity. However,
because the authentication and the QKD can not be simultaneous, Eve can escape the
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authentication procedure. In addition, quantum key distribution protocol is completely
insecurity under the attacking of middle-attack.
In this paper, we proposed a QKD protocol that can simultaneously distribute the
quantum secret key and verify the communicators’ identity. The QKD is implemented by
the previous EPR protocol, the authentication is implemented by the symmetric crypto-
graphic scheme with quantum effects. The presented scheme is provably secure.
we use EPR effects with Bell’ theorem to implement quantum authentication. It can
prevent impersonation and middle-attack. Of course, it can also be implemented by non-
commute quantum states or non-orthogonal quantum states with Heisenberg uncertainty
principle.
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